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ABSTRACT: After decades of political passivity, Italian students have massively mobilized in the years 2008 
and 2010 to protest the implementation of two political measures fostering a neoliberal conception of 
higher education. More notably, the casus belli of these mobilizations concerned the implementation of a 
financial measure cutting public funding for higher education in 2008, accompanied by a New Public Man-
agement (NPM) reform of university governance in 2010. Despite a high rate of participation, none of the 
two mobilizations managed to alter the political course of events. The Italian government approved and 
implemented the two measures and the Italian student movement lost this political battle. In short, recent 
student mobilizations failed to produce any policy impact on the Italian field of higher education. Why was 
this the case? My argument is that organizationally and politically fragmented protests are not able to in-
fluence policy issues that have a low public relevance, especially in periods of economic crisis and political 
austerity. I contend that this was precisely the case of the Italian student protests of 2008 and 2010.  
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1. Introduction 
 
After decades of political passivity, Italian students mobilized in large numbers in 
the years 2008 and 2010 to protest the implementation of political measures fostering 
a neoliberal conception of higher education. In 2008, the casus belli of the mobiliza-
tion was the implementation of cuts to the public funding for higher education, 
whereas in 2010 it consisted in the setting up of a New Public Management (NPM) re-
form of university governance. More notably, Italian students undertook two distinct 
protest campaigns in concomitance with the processes of enactment of two national 
laws, Law 133/2008 introducing significant cuts to the public system of funding, and 
Law 240/2010 providing for the restructuring of the university governance towards a 
managerial pattern. The first student campaign lasted three months (between October 
and December 2008), the second one two months (between October and December 
2010).  
“Noi non paghiamo la vostra crisi (We do not pay your crisis)!” This was the slogan 
chanted in the student protests, which took place in many Italian cities and universi-
ties since October 2008. More specifically, this slogan indicated the refusal by the gen-
eration of students that was attending Italian universities in 2008 to undergo the ef-
fects of the economic crisis, epitomized by the cuts affecting the sector of higher edu-
cation provided for by the law 133 (1,5 billions of euro in 5 years). The main measures 
regarding the Italian university system provided for by the law 133/2008, and contest-
ed by the university students, were three: cuts to the fund for ordinary financing 
(“Fondo per il Finanziamento Ordinario”- FFO), the turn-over and recruitment of new 
professors, and the transformation of universities into private foundations. By chant-
ing “we do not pay your crisis,” Italian students tried to make manifest their willing-
ness not to undergo a generalized process of social downgrading affecting the condi-
tion of their generation (Raparelli 2009; Roggero 2010). 
Law 240/2010 aimed at modifying the institutional governance of universities in the 
direction of a managerial pattern, fostering the centralization of the university leader-
ship, the managerialization of decisional bodies, and the reduction of power of the col-
legial organs (Regini 2014). Opposing such a process of managerialization, Italian stu-
dents mobilized for the return to a more democratic universities in which the weakest 
academic components should have had the same decisional power of the traditionally 
more powerful components in the governing bodies. What is more, in 2010 the stu-
dents were not the only university actors in mobilization. Law 240/2010 also estab-
lished the extinction of the role of researchers (until their depletion), and simultane-
ously the introduction of a new figure of fixed-term researcher (TD- “Tempo Determi-
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nato”). In the plan of the government, the fixed-term researcher should have gradually 
replaced the researcher with position, more expensive and unmovable. Facing this 
blackmail, the researchers rejected what was regarded as “a race at the bottom” and 
started organizing and mobilizing from the early months of 2010.  
Although both the student protests of 2008 and those of 2010 had the government 
as their main political target, a crucial difference between them rested on the combi-
nation and type of allies on which students could rely. If in 2008 Italian professors ex-
pressed a generic feeling of opposition to the cuts to higher education, in 2010 they 
had a more nuanced position towards the managerialization of the governance, bring-
ing them in several cases to react negatively to the student mobilization. The re-
searchers were completely absent in the mobilizations of 2008, while they played a 
crucial role in those of 2010. In short, whilst Italian professors held a passive and/or 
negative position towards the student protests of 2008 and 2010, the researchers got 
involved in those of 2010. 
Despite a high rate of participation, none of the two mobilizations managed to alter 
the course of the political events. The Italian government approved and implemented 
the two measures and the Italian student movement lost this political battle. In short, 
the recent student mobilizations failed to produce any policy impact on the Italian 
field of higher education. Why was this the case, despite the large mobilizations of 
students? I argue that the absence of a nationally recognized student organization 
leading the protest, coupled with the low political attention paid to higher education 
policy constitute the main factors explaining such a lack of impact. To probe this prop-
osition empirically, I have interviewed the principal actors involved in these events 
(student leaders, academic authorities and policy makers) and consulted statistical da-
ta concerning the public salience of various policy issues in Italy during the period un-
der investigation. 
 
 
1. Student organizing and higher education policy 
 
The impact of student protests in the field of higher education since the last big 
wave of student protest – begun in 2008 – has received scant scholarly attention in the 
social sciences. This neglect, however, is not determined by a lack of scientific interest 
in issues of higher education. On the contrary, in the social sciences there are several 
disciplinary approaches and epistemological paradigms dedicated to understanding the 
field of higher education and the behaviours of its inhabitants. Sociology of higher edu-
cation, public policy, political economy, and social movement studies (to list only the 
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most evident cases) represent various and distinct disciplines that explore how stu-
dents affect and are affected by higher education institutions (HEIs). At the risk of 
oversimplification, it is possible to identify two distinct epistemological approaches to 
this field.  
On the one hand, there are disciplines, such as the sociology of higher education, or-
ganization theory, public policy, and political economy, whose approaches aim at in-
vestigating institutionalized student behaviour and the formalized setting of norms and 
institutions in which this behaviour occurs (see Capano et al. 2017). On the other hand, 
disciplines such as social movement studies and contentious politics are more interest-
ed in exploring the causes and effects of non-institutionalized student behaviour (see 
della Porta 2010). In short, these distinct approaches tackle the issue of student behav-
iour in higher education by stressing and investigating different, and even alternative, 
aspects of it. This may explain the reason why the disciplines adopting these two ap-
proaches seldom speak to each other and even more rarely share common concepts 
and frameworks of analysis. More concretely, while social movement studies focus 
their attention mainly on student protests and contentious politics on campus, the so-
ciology of higher education and organization theory are more interested in exploring 
the behaviour of students and their organizations in the daily life of university institu-
tions.  
This analytical distinction however reveals itself to be both unrealistic and limiting, 
particularly in the investigation of several real-world phenomena – such as the influ-
ence of non-institutionalized actions within formalized settings and arenas (Jasper 
2015) – which lie at the intersection of the two epistemological approaches. In line 
with a recent strand of research combining social movement studies and organization 
theory (McAdam and Scott 2005, Soule 2013), this articles tries to build a bridge be-
tween these approaches, with the ambition of starting a debate capable, eventually, of 
yielding a shared analytical framework explaining the impact of student protests on the 
higher education field. More succinctly, the time seems ripe to attempt to set up a dia-
logue between social movement studies and the sociology of higher education (Cini 
and Guzman-Concha 2017). 
This section sketches those features of student action and of the higher education 
field in which this action occurs that I see as crucial in explaining the impact, or lack 
thereof, of student protests. More precisely, I have singled out two characteristics, 
whose precise configuration affects the impact that student protests can achieve with-
in the field of higher education. The first one concerns the forms of student organizing, 
while the second one the public salience of higher education policy. In the article, I will 
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illustrate how a specific configuration of these characteristics has shaped the impact of 
student protests in the field of Italian higher education between 2008 and 2010. 
Sociologists of higher education have recently constructed typologies on the forms 
of student organizing. For instance, Klemencic (2012, 2014) looks at the forms of col-
lective organizing that students establish in the higher education field to represent 
their institutional interest before local and national political authorities. The most in-
novative aspect of such a typology is its relational character. Klemencic accounts for 
the type of relations that student organizations entertain with public authorities, and 
especially with the state. Her analysis distinguishes between higher education fields in 
which relations between organizations which represent students and public authorities 
is “neo-corporatist,” and those in which such a relation is defined, instead, as “plural-
ist” (Klemencic 2012). The neo-corporatist type of interaction involves a situation in 
which a small number of prominent student associations act as intermediaries and are 
formally involved in public decision making concerning student issues. Typically, such 
associations have compulsory membership and extend to the entire student body. In 
contrast, a pluralist type of relation characterizes a field in which there are several stu-
dent organizations claiming to represent the student body and competing for access to 
policy making. Consequently, in such pluralist settings the state does not recognize a 
single legitimate interlocutor. Aiming constantly at incrementing the student member-
ship within their ranks, these associations compete also to increase their public legiti-
macy and representation capacity before the student body. 
This distinction between neo-corporatist and pluralist types of relation allows us to 
map out higher education fields according to the presence of nation-wide student or-
ganizations (and/or networks of student organizations) that are formally entitled to 
take part in public decision-making. In neo-corporatist fields, these actors are present, 
normally alongside more or less formalized structures of representation and influence 
vis-à-vis public authorities. In pluralist fields, instead, they are normally absent (see 
Klemencic et al. 2016). Based on this, one would expect neo-corporatist type of rela-
tions to grant to student organizations a certain influence over decision-making, one 
greater and stronger than what would be possible under a pluralist regime. In neo-
corporatist fields, formally recognized organizations representing the student body are 
the only legitimate associations: only they are allowed access to political organs in 
which decisions on higher education are taken, and only they are allowed to participate 
in institutional meetings with state authorities. This proximity to decisional bodies and 
actors should grant to these organizations a greater potential for political influence 
than that of their counterparts in pluralist fields, where there is no permanent institu-
tional access to decisional bodies. 
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Yet, this expectation is confirmed mostly in times on institutional stability, i.e. when 
the dynamics of interaction within the higher education field proceed according to 
consolidated norms and interests (see Bourdieu 1988). In conditions of institutional in-
stability, the situation is different (Fligstein and McAdam 2013). This happens, for in-
stance, when student protests occur and subvert the institutional order of university 
life (Cini 2016b). Protest can in fact be employed by students as an alternative re-
source, besides traditional institutional means, through which to face up to public au-
thorities in the effort to influence and challenge them (della Porta and Diani 2006). 
When protest occurs, relations between students and political authorities can be signif-
icantly altered in terms of power balance. When protests occur, state-recognized stu-
dent organizations are not always capable of maintaining their representative capacity, 
and consequently negotiating force vis-à-vis political authorities. In times of institu-
tional crisis, this representative capacity seems to depend more on their centrality in 
the organization of protest than on their proximity with state authorities. To the extent 
that such a proximity is unfolded and/or perceived as a relation of dependency on 
state authorities, the political credibility of these organizations can decrease.  
This may explain why the student organization leading the protest often obtains the 
greatest legitimacy and representation capacity within the student body and can con-
sequently become the most credible political interlocutor for public authorities. From 
this perspective, we can appreciate how it is not only the type of higher education field 
(neo-corporatist vs. pluralist) which empowers student organizations, but also their po-
litical traditions and protest culture (della Porta 2010). Regardless of their institutional 
configuration, higher education fields in which students have a strong protest tradition 
are generally more open to student influence than fields in which such a tradition is 
historically low. Recent studies have for instance shown that the policy impact of politi-
cal student organizations in periods of protest within a pluralist field, such as France in 
2007 (Genicot 2012), is significantly higher than the impact of the same kind of organi-
zations during protests within a neo-corporatist field, such as England in 2010 (Cini 
2016a). Is therefore the distinction between neo-corporatist and pluralist fields of 
higher education of little use for assessing the policy impact of student protests?  
With a number of amendments, I believe, the distinction can still be helpful. The 
principal amendment concerns the role of protest (or contentious politics). Although 
protest is not completely absent in Klemencic’s original framework (see Klemencic 
2012), it does not have a central position and, as noted above, this underestimation 
reduces the explanatory capacity and analytical scope of such a framework. Students’ 
contentious activities and organizations are not taken seriously in consideration and, 
therefore, their influence in the higher education field is hardly understood and ex-
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plained. To account for the role of protest one needs to focus on student organizations 
that are involved in protest activities, and one can distinguish between nation-wide 
and unitary ways of organizing protest and local and fragmented ones. The first scenar-
io involves an organizational field of the protest (Crossley 2003) in which one hege-
monic organization (and/or network of organizations) has the capacity to be the only 
legitimate political actor leading the student protest. This makes the organizational 
field of the protest unitary and equipped with a nation-wide scope of political action. 
By contrast, the other scenario involves protest field in which several organizations 
(and/or networks of organizations) are involved and compete for the leadership of the 
protest. Normally, this scenario depicts the case of locally-based networks of organiza-
tions connecting different subnational geographical areas and/or university campuses, 
which sometimes can be accompanied by the presence of a nation-wide organization 
having, however, a low degree of autonomy vis-à-vis state authorities and not taking 
part in the protest.1 Either way, none of these organizations has the capacity to lead 
the protest and attain a nation-wide level of political intervention. As a result, this or-
ganizational field appears politically fragmented. 
The modes of student organization cannot, by themselves, explain the impact that 
protests effect on the higher education field. Student organizations do not pursue their 
goals in an institutional void, but are forced to confront themselves with the political 
features of the context in which they act. In short, it is not possible to explain the policy 
impact of student protests without taking into consideration some specific contextual 
conditions within which these protests arise, develop, and produce impact (della Porta 
and Diani 2006). Social movement scholars maintain that “the impact of movements is 
mediated strongly by political conditions” (Amenta et el. 1992, 335). Social movement 
literature defines these contextual factors as political opportunity structures (POSs). 
The theoretical models that account for them in explaining movement impact are 
 
1 This is where my framework, which embraces protest, distances itself most from Klemencic’s. Her 
framework is primarily interested in investigating student representative organizations in their institution-
al relations with political authorities and bodies. By contrast, I look at student organizations in their rela-
tions with political authorities and bodies when and to the extent that protest plays a role. In short, I only 
consider those organizations that are involved in protest campaigns. This means that I do not take into ac-
count those student organizations that are formally recognized as the sole representative organizations 
but are completely marginalized in the organization of protest. This appears sometime to be the situation 
of nation-wide student organizations in neo-corporatist fields of higher education. Such organizations are 
the actors that entertain relations with political authorities in times of institutional stability but—given 
their high degree of state dependency—are completely marginal in the organization of student protest. If 
one aims to account for the role of protest in the relations between students and authorities, one needs to 
modify this excessively rigid distinction between neo-corporatist and pluralist fields of higher education. 
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known as “political mediation model” (Giugni 2004). According to this model, ‘‘political 
opportunity structures influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of so-
cial movements on their environment’’ (Kitschelt 1986: 58). Social movement scholars 
have distinguished between ‘‘open’’ and ‘‘closed’’ structures, that is, “structures which 
allow for easy access to the political system or which make access more difficult” 
(Kriesi 2004: 69-70). The impact of protest is more effective when political opportuni-
ties are open, especially when allies emerge in the political system (della Porta and Di-
ani 2006). The concept of political opportunity structure implies stability but it is useful 
to treat stability as a variable element, running from highly inert components that are 
more or less permanent features of the terrain to windows of opportunity that may be 
open only briefly (Gamson and Meyer 1996). The presence of divisions between the 
elites and/or institutional allies, the type of electoral system, the centraliza-
tion/decentralization of political powers, the support of public opinion are, amongst 
several other factors, types of environmental conditions that help or inhibit movement 
change (Kriesi 2004).  
More notably, research exploring the impact of social movements on public policies 
has highlighted the presence of a supportive public opinion and of a high mass atten-
tiveness as key contextual factors explaining movement success (Burstein 1999, Gam-
son 2004, Luders 2016). According to Burstein’s theory of democratic representation 
(1999), the most important conditions determining the victory or defeat of a move-
ment are in fact a favourable public opinion and a high level of public attention on the 
targeted issue. In his view, social movements frequently “fail to get what they want be-
cause a majority of the public wants something else” (Burstein 1999: 9). This is ex-
plained by the fact that in order to be re-elected or not to lose electoral consensus, 
politicians are mostly interested in satisfying the public opinion’s preferences on policy 
issues, which public opinion itself considers as a political priority (Gamson 2004). In 
short, social movements “are highly likely to succeed if public opinion is both support-
ive and attentive or fail if the reverse is true” (Luders 2016: 189).  
Also public policy studies have regarded these two related conditions (i.e. a support-
ive public opinion and a high political salience) as crucial to make a policy issue more or 
less open to the influence of social actors (Laver 2001, Culpepper 2011, Capano et al. 
2017). Laver (2001) has, for instance, shown that the influence of advocacy groups (i.e. 
interest groups, social movements, NGOs) on the political outcomes of a policy field 
depends on the political importance that such field takes on for that country. This 
seems to be particularly true in the case of social movements, whose low amount of 
institutional resources on which to rely means that high political salience becomes a 
potentially fundamental resource to influence policy decisions. Research in political 
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economy has in fact shown that the low salience of an issue seems to favour the inter-
est and power of those actors that dominate its policy field. Culpepper (2011) has high-
lighted the presence of this mechanism by investigating the issue of corporate control. 
He showed (2011, 113) that “when issues are of low salience, the lobbying capacity of 
managers and the deference to their expertise by politicians and the press are im-
portant assets.” Put more clearly, Culpepper found out that “the low salience of corpo-
rate control converts the expertise of managers into a powerful political weapon” 
(112). In this sense, the political salience of an issue can say much on the kind of social 
actor that is potentially able to influence a given policy field. For Luders (2016: 190), 
“under circumstances of low salience, there are multiple combinations that are pre-
dicted to coincide with other outcomes.” 
Applied to the case of student movements, this means that in countries where pub-
lic opinion considers higher education as a politically salient issue, student protests are 
expected to be taken into more serious consideration by governments and, therefore, 
are more likely to influence higher education policy. This occurs insofar as not taking 
into serious consideration the concerns of a fraction of population (students and their 
families) whose policy field is perceived as socially relevant may bring the government 
to lose its political support. To avoid this, the government may thus be willing to make 
some concessions to the students. Yet, this latter outcome depends also on the politi-
cal credibility exhibited by the student organizations in charge of the protest. In other 
words, it depends on the capacity of such organizations to be truly representative of 
the protests combined with their willingness to negotiate with the government in order 
to defend and put forward student demands. In short, student organizations have to be 
perceived as a credible political actor posing a realistic threat for the government and 
its agenda. 
By crossing the two above features, namely, modes of student organizing and policy 
salience, it is then possible to illustrate hypotheses on the four possible situations as-
sociated with the impact of student protests on the policy of higher education (see 
Tab. 1). 
A high public attention on higher education is more likely to bring the government to 
address the issues brought up by protest. A social dissatisfaction in a relevant policy 
field may soon transform itself into a politically serious issue, and this may induce the 
government to offer a prompt and positive response to the protesters’ demands. How-
ever, such an outcome depends mostly on the protesters’ capacity to be a credible po-
litical interlocutor vis-à-vis the government. This, in turn, requires a protest led by an 
organization having a high representative capacity and the willingness to engage in po-
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litical negotiation with the government (top-right cell, Tab. 1). The latter can then de-
cide to satisfy the students in order to prevent bigger political problems. 
  
Table 1. The impact of student protests on higher education policy 
  Salience of higher education policy 
 
Ways of organizing student 
protest 
 Low High 
Unitary and nation-wide Low High 
Fragmented and locally-based - Low  
Legend: “-“= no impact, “Low”= low impact, “High”= high impact 
This does not seem to be the case when the student protest is fragmented and local-
ly-based, as the plethora of competing organizations which characterize these situa-
tions generally fail to successfully represent the entirety of the student body and to 
present a unitary and clear political orientation before the government. Lacking a cred-
ible political interlocutor, the government can then successfully tame the protest by 
hijacking student demands and offering some marginal gains to the protesters (bot-
tom-right cell, Tab. 1). An even worse impact (no impact) is expected to occur when a 
fragmented student protest takes place in a country where higher education has a low 
political salience. In this case, the government can in fact take advantage of the low in-
terest that the public shows towards the issue to silence the protesters and to adopt 
and implement its full policy agenda. To do so, the government can appeal to the ne-
cessity of sacrificing the interests of these actors to produce greater benefits for other 
more important policy fields and for society as a whole (bottom-left cell, Tab. 1). I con-
tend that this was precisely the case of the student protests in Italy in 2008 and 2010. 
Lastly, a low impact is expected to occur also for the case in which a low political sali-
ence of higher education is associated with the presence of a unitary and nation-wide 
organization leading the student protest. Although the student protesters constitute a 
credible political actor, the low salience of the issues concerning higher education 
makes the government not particularly willing or interested in coming to an agreement 
with the protesters. Higher education is not a political priority in the governmental 
agenda (top-right cell, Tab. 1).  
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2. Data and methodology 
 
Broadly speaking, assessing the impact of protests is one of the most difficult tasks 
for social movement scholars (Bosi et al. 2016, Giugni 1998). The identification and rep-
resentation of the causal mechanisms that connect protests with actual policy out-
comes is even more challenging (Kolb 2007). The methodology that I adopted to identi-
fy the causal mechanism underlying the policy failure of the Italian students in their 
protest campaigns of 2008 and 2010 is ‘process tracing’ (George and Bennett 2005). 
Process tracing is a research procedure ‘designed to identify processes linking a set of 
initial conditions to a particular outcome’ (Vennesson 2008, 224). Its adoption allows 
one to identify the ‘chains of interaction that filter structural conditions and produce 
effects’ (della Porta 2013: 24). Exploring them in the study of social movements means 
looking for those ’processes connecting movement actions to observed outcomes’ 
(Bosi et al. 2016, 24). Following this lead, I adopted this methodology to attempt to 
identify those processes which, related on the one hand to traits of the protest and on 
the other to the Italian higher education policy, connect the former (i.e. protests, 
“movement actions”) to the latter (i.e. “observed outcomes”, in this case a lack of poli-
cy impact). 
To collect all the relevant data and information allowing me to accomplish this task, I 
employed the following methods: in-depth interviews with the main actors involved; 
analysis of the student organizations’ main political documents; and analysis of rele-
vant statistical data on Italian public opinion. Concerning in-depth interviews, I inter-
viewed several leaders and activists of the main student movement organizations. I 
was interested in knowing the political strategies and goals of their organizations as 
well as their inter-organizational relations. I interviewed several policy makers who 
were at the time committed to reform Italian higher education and several ministerial 
officials to collect information about their modus operandi and their reaction to the 
student protests targeting them. Furthermore, I interviewed several key stakeholders 
of the Italian higher education field (i.e., rectors and the presidents of CRUI, the na-
tional rectors’ association) to know their stance both on the wave of reforms and on 
the student protests. Finally, I interviewed several experts working on Italian higher 
education policy, in order to gather a scholarly knowledge on it, on the logic of its evo-
lution, and on the various reform cycles. As for documentary analysis, I collected and 
consulted the main political documents elaborated by the various student organiza-
tions in the two protest campaigns to know more about their political goals and their 
inter-organizational relations. Finally, I consulted the Eurobarometer data presenting 
the most politically relevant issues for the Italian public opinion in the years 2005-
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20016 to assess the political salience of the issue of higher education in the Italian pub-
lic debate. 
 
 
3. The Italian student protests and their policy impact 
 
Why didn’t Italian students achieve any significant policy gain in their confrontation 
with the Italian government, in spite of their large mobilizations? My argument is that 
organizationally and politically fragmented protests are not able to influence policy is-
sues that have a low public relevance, especially in periods of economic crisis and polit-
ical austerity. The analysis of recent student protests in Italy seems to confirm this 
proposition. First, the Italian student movement was highly fragmented in terms of po-
litical and organizational structure. Secondly, Italian higher education is neither tradi-
tionally considered as an important policy issue by public opinion, nor did the recent 
student protests succeed in increasing this interest significantly. More specifically, I 
contend that even though Italian students were able for a certain period to increase 
the public attention on the cuts on higher education funds and on the managerializa-
tion of the university governance, they did not manage to persuade the government 
that such an increase of attention was also related to a shift in terms of public support 
towards the student protests. All in all, this peculiar combination of organizational and 
contextual factors has prevented student protesters from being effective in influencing 
the higher education policy of the Italian government.  
The ways of organizing student protests in Italy have been historically associated 
with the fragmented and locally-based type. This was the case of the student mobiliza-
tions of the “long 1968” and of those of 1990s (Cini 2016b). The locally based nature 
and the political and organizational fragmentation seemed to be central characteristics 
also of the most recent student protests of 2008 and 2010 (Caruso et al. 2010). Speak-
ing of these latter protests, Capano, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Bolo-
gna, argued in fact that they were connoted by a “high fragmentation of their political 
representation, which is very high especially among the leftist organizations “ 
According to several observers, this fragmentation is related to the highly ideological 
legacy of the Italian student groups, historically embedded in broader cycles of strug-
gle. All the past generations of student activists were in fact immersed and influenced 
by larger protest cycles, strongly shaping their cultural repertoire of actions and dis-
courses (Tarrow 1989). If the “1968” movement was part of a long protest cycle where 
the labour movement was by far the central actor, the generation of activists of the 
student movement of 1990 flowed into the movement against the Gulf war and into 
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that of the social centers (Mudu 2004). Likewise, the student activists of the movement 
of 2008/10 inherited, to a certain extent, the protest forms and claims from the activ-
ists of the “global justice movement” and, more especially, their demands for a more 
radical process of social redistribution. This peculiarity has always led Italian student 
activists to be more interested in joining the various political factions of the Italian left 
and movements than in attending to the higher education issues (Caruso et al. 2010). 
To this regard, Catalano, consultant of the university funding system for the Italian 
Ministry of Education, University and Research in the years 1993-1998, was very critical 
towards the entirety of Italian student movements and their political goals, when he 
claimed, “I have never seen student movements capable of elaborating a credible cul-
tural plan for the reform of higher education since I have started to work in the Italian 
university system. If, for instance, we had had politically credible movements, the issue 
of student rights would not be so tragic today.” 
Both in 2008 and 2010, the organizational field of Italian students consisted of sev-
eral locally based groups exhibiting the ambition to be representative of the entire stu-
dent body, even though they usually have different names in every city (Genicot 
2012).2 During the protest campaign of 2008 there were three student organizations 
(or networks of organizations) performing this role, while in the campaign of 2010 
there were five. Founded in 1994, UDU is the largest Italian student group in terms of 
membership, and it is organized by an internal statute and formalized decision-making 
procedures. UDU is politically linked to CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana del La-
voro, General Italian Confederation of Labor). Yet, it was marginal in the organization 
of the protests, as it was accused of professing an excessively moderate political orien-
tation by other student groups, both in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, two other organiza-
tions were involved in the protest: Uniriot and Atenei in Rivolta. Linked to social cen-
tres (Uniriot) and to far leftwing parties (Atenei in Rivolta), these sub-national networks 
 
2 The Italian landscape of student organizations is much more complex. One can assess the complexity of 
such a landscape by looking at the myriad of lists presenting candidates to the election of the CNSU (Con-
siglio Nazionale Degli Studenti Universitari [National Council of University Students]), which is a consulta-
tive council for the Italian Ministry of Education and Research, composed of 28 students elected every 
three years. In this sense, Italy is a typical case of pluralist field of higher education (Klemencic 2012). Un-
like other countries, Italian law does not set any legal provisions: financing of students’ unions is for in-
stance completely dependent on student projects, membership fees, and more or less transparent part-
nerships with political parties, unions or interest groups (Genicot 2012). However, I do not consider these 
student lists and the institutional channel of the CNSU as relevant to explain the policy impact of Italian 
students. Italian students tend in fact to underestimate the role of formal student politics (as a clear indi-
cation of it, let us think of the traditionally very low level of turnout in university elections: between 5% 
and 15%) and of the institutional channels of representation. 
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of student were central in the organization of protests in many universities, and com-
peted against each other with the ambition of becoming the politically hegemonic or-
ganization of the Italian student movement. Uniriot, close to the area of “Italian Au-
tonomy” was present in the universities of Rome, Padua, Bologna, Milan, Naples, Turin, 
and Venice, while Atenei in Rivolta, linked to the national Trotskyist party of Sinistra 
Critica (Critical Left), in the universities of Bari, Bologna, Firenze, Milano, Reggio Ca-
labria, Roma, and Trento. Although both networks of students aimed at radically trans-
forming Italian higher education by opposing the neoliberal agenda of the government, 
they carried out different tactics of action and political strategies. This difference con-
stituted one of the main causes of the split, and consequent failure, of the national as-
sembly of the Italian student movement held at the University of Sapienza in Rome in 
November 2008. While Atenei in Rivolta intended to construct a national political or-
ganization of the movement with a formalized decision making structure, Uniriot pre-
ferred to maintain a movement-like type of organization, with a loose network of rela-
tions and informal decision making procedures. In the words of Luca, one of the lead-
ers of Uniriot: 
 
Their [Atenei in Rivolta] way of conceiving the organization of the protest did not re-
flect the political potential of the movement. We believe that organization should not be 
an obstacle but a way to multiply the power of the movement. In our view, this cannot 
occur if we build a formalized coordination of student representatives according to the 
French model [of the 2007 student protests that Atenei in Rivolta aimed to adopt in the 
Italian situation].  
A further consequence of the failure of the national student assembly in November 
2008 was the establishment of two other sub-national networks of groups, Link and 
Red-Net, founded in early 2009. Both groups were in fact critical towards the organiza-
tions that had led the protest in 2008. More especially, they accused Uniriot and Atenei 
in Rivolta of being responsible of the failure of the movement to impact at the national 
level. According to them, both Uniriot and Atenei in Rivolta missed an opportunity to 
create a nationwide unitary organization voicing the concerns of students. As Lorenzo, 
one of the future leaders of Link, confided to me in his interview: 
In 2008, the movement did not have any organizational structure, neither locally nor 
at the national level. We did not manage to organize a politically credible actor capable 
of negotiating with the ministry and the government. At the national assembly in Rome, 
we argued with other student groups precisely over this issue: some of us wanted to cre-
ate a national political structure of the protests. We failed. Because of this failure, the 
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movement was unable to entertain any kind of political or institutional relation with offi-
cial authorities for the remainder of the 2008 campaign. 
Although sharing this view on the causes of the decline of the 2008 protests, Link and 
Red-Net had a very different take on how to lead the student movement and on how 
to reform Italian higher education. Link emerged as a split from UDU (which had been 
accused of being too moderate) and put forward a trade unionist line whose goal was 
to make Italian universities more democratic and participatory. This stance emerges 
very clearly in the narration of Elena, a student activist and a member of Link’s national 
executive. 
We as LINK believe that there are three tools which, jointly, successfully affect higher 
education policy. They are: adaptive claims [“vertenza”], representation, and conflict. 
They cannot stand separately. Representation only works if we have concrete demands 
to put forward, which means that we have to seriously study university policies and reg-
ulations and come up with alternative proposals. Representation and counter-proposals, 
in turn, do not work without conflict, because if outside there are no students creating 
pressure, this thing does not work. These three things [adaptive claims, representation, 
and conflict] are the pillars on which we have built LINK. What we don’t like about UDU 
is that they think that one can raise demands only through representation. What we 
don’t like about the [antagonist] student collectives is that they think it’s possible to win 
things only through conflict and without representation; and actually very often even 
without a specific demand: conflict for conflict’s sake. For us, these three things must be 
linked together for student politics to be effective.  
Link was present in the university campuses of Bari, Bologna, Foggia, Lecce, Milano, 
Napoli, Padova, Roma, Pisa, Salerno, Siena, Taranto, Torino, Trieste, and Urbino. In 
contrast, Red-Net gathered all the student groups with a Marxist Leninist orientation, 
whose main political goal was to transform higher education into a field of (class) 
struggle. For them, student politics cannot be understood as institutional mediation 
but as conflict and antagonism. In this sense, a student movement should ‘develop an-
tagonistic and incompatible attitudes towards the system.’ Student movements are po-
litical only to the extent that they are able to express incompatibility vis-à-vis the status 
quo. They have to pursue ‘an intrinsic politicization, exhibiting dissatisfaction for what 
exists. This politicization is the expression of dissatisfaction and incompatibility with 
the extant. The contestation of the system in which we live.’ The main aim of a revolu-
tionary student organization is to politicize and socialize as many students as possible 
to the new language of social conflict. Red-Net was active in the universities of Milano, 
Padova, Napoli, Roma, Firenze, and Palermo.  
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In sum, the protest organization field of Italian students appeared highly fragmented 
in political terms in both 2008 and 2010. This made the emergence or the construction 
of a national actor capable of fully representing students and negotiating their de-
mands with the government impossible. 
The difficulty of the emergence of a politically credible student actor at the national 
level constituted also one of the reasons explaining the incapacity of the Italian stu-
dents to increase beyond a certain point the level of attention that the political system 
devoted to the issues of the contested reforms. This, at least, was the perception of 
several important student leaders, who claimed that Italian students have historically 
been victims of a lack of consideration by Italian governments and by the media sys-
tem. As a former founder of UDU Forli and UDU International officer confirmed this in 
an interview, quoted in Genicot (2012: 64), in which he compared Italy and England: 
 
If the English students’ union says ‘I organize a demonstration,’ the minister tears his 
hair out. If UDU says ‘I organize a demonstration,’ maybe the minister will never know [. . 
.] when journalists do not write about universities, the government does not want to see 
you, nor do the rectors, you have to find a way to make yourself heard. 
All the policy makers, state officials, and experts of the Italian field of higher educa-
tion that I interviewed confirmed this perception. In this sense, higher education is still 
perceived as something detached from the main dynamics of Italian society. A majority 
of Italians, especially from lower social classes, do not see higher education as a public 
good able to generate high social and economic benefits. For Capano, the social per-
ception of the low importance and value of higher education in Italy is also to be im-
puted to the fact the Italian higher education is not seen as an engine of social mobility 
as in the German or English systems. ‘That is why there is no strong social bloc support-
ing higher education in Italy. It is no coincidence that it has never been a relevant polit-
ical issue.’ 
Professor Moscati, Chair in Sociology of Education at the University Bicocca in Milan, 
distinguishes between the low attention devoted to higher education by public opinion 
and the low interest shown by the political class.  
 
We should distinguish public opinion from politics. Italian public opinion has historical-
ly underestimated the issue of higher education. […] Recently, we have assisted to a fur-
ther decline of interest towards higher education by public opinion in virtue of certain 
scandals related to academic recruitment. The idea that the university system is rife with 
corruption is socially widespread today. On the other hand, the Italian political class is 
not interested in the issue of higher education. It is not seen as an important factor for 
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the social and economic development of our country, as it is in the UK. With the eco-
nomic crisis of 2008 the Italian government has drastically reduced public funding for 
higher education, when in other countries governments have increased it. In Italy, the 
importance of higher education in our economy is not perceived. We believe that the 
formation of high-skilled professional figures is not essential for our economy. 
 
All the policy makers and state officials I interviewed confirmed such an impression: 
higher education has been traditionally a politically marginal policy issue in the public 
agenda of Italian politics and of public opinion. For instance, according to Catalano, 
‘the institutional political debate on higher education has never been strategic in our 
country. The debate mostly occurs in a hysterical manner on single and contingent ep-
isodes, such as on the scandal of academic recruitment.’ In other words, the Italian 
university system is still seen as a sort of ivory tower, and this perception relegates the 
issue to political marginality.  
This impression seems to be confirmed by the data of a recent study, commissioned 
and funded by the European Commission, illustrating the most politically salient issues 
among European citizens in the years 2005-2016 (see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/General/index). The 
main question of the survey asks respondents what the two most important issues in 
their country are. In every European country, these issues are “Unemployment” and 
“Economic situation.” “Education” is one of the most marginal. This finding turns out 
to be particularly strong in Italy, where the issue of “Education” is perceived as one of 
the least important issues. More precisely, the average percentage value for the years 
2005-2016 is 2,7%, with values equal or inferior to the 2% in nine cases: 2% (05/2005), 
1,07% (09/2006), 1,63% (09/2007), 1,39% (03/2008), 1,84% (05/2012), 1,55% 
(05/2013), 1,16% (11/2013), 1.89% (03/2014), 1,07% (05/2014) (see Fig. 1, below). 
These values seem to be impressively low if one thinks that the average values of the 
two most important policy issues, “Unemployment” and the “Economic situation,” are 
above 40%, or if compared to the average value for higher education in other Europe-
an countries such as the UK (7,6%). 
Survey results regarding the most important political issues for Italian public opinion 
in the last decade (2005-2016) seem to confirm the impression of Italian policymakers 
and experts of higher education policy: higher education is not a political priority for 
Italian society. What is more, these data also show that the recent student protests 
have not been influential in significantly changing the relevance of higher education in 
the Italian public opinion, both during the protests and in the period immediately af-
terwards.  
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Figure 1. What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the moment? Italy (from 
05/2005 to 05/2016) 
 
Source:  
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart//themeKy/42
/groupKy/208/savFile/54 
However, these data do not say much about the changes of political attitudes that 
the student protests may have provoked on the Italian public opinion (as well as on the 
Italian mainstream media). With respect to this, a good proxy can be represented by 
the media coverage that the Italian mainstream newspapers gave of the protests and 
of the contested issues. In analysing the news coverage that la Repubblica provided of 
the student protests in 2008 and 2010, Cini (2016b) claims that these protests contrib-
uted to positively influencing the news frames of such contentious issue. In the course 
of the protest campaign of 2008, la Repubblica has in fact gradually modified its media 
coverage by reporting more and more positively the student protests and their de-
mands. This view is somehow confirmed by several student leaders I interviewed. As 
Lorenzo confided to me: 
Thanks to our protests, we succeeded in undermining the perceptions of unanimity 
and of popularity that revolved around the third Berlusconi government. We constitut-
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ed the first successful experience of social opposition to that government. The honey 
moon between Berlusconi and the Italian people ended up there. It was our main 
achievement. 
Yet, even assuming that Italian students successfully modified the political attitude 
of the Italian public opinion on the issue of higher education, this shift seemed not to 
affect the policy decisions of the government. This fact confirms thus Burstein’s theory 
of democratic representation (1999). When the public relevance of a policy issue is 
low, the public opinion’s preference is not highly considered by the politicians. In short, 
politicians do not feel responsive to social movement demands when the public inter-
est on the contentious issue is low. The Italian student protests seemed precisely to fall 
in the latter case. Since the protests did not succeed in increasing significantly the in-
terest of the Italian public opinion towards higher education, one can derive that, also 
for this reason, they failed to influence the policy decision of the government over it.  
Most of the various actors I interviewed confirmed to me this interpretation. The 
student protests of 2008 and 2010 did not manage to gain a sufficient political credibil-
ity to persuade the government to change its orientation with respect to the contested 
issues of higher education. If the student leaders have unanimously perceived the 
fragmented character of the movement as crucial in determining its failure, the fact 
that their political interlocutors (that is, former ministries and undersecretaries) have 
expressed similar views seems very telling of the validity of this interpretation. The re-
flection expressed by Professor Berlinguer, former Ministry of Education, University, 
and Research (MIUR), goes precisely in this direction, when he argues that, 
 
The student movement against the Gelmini Law [2010] was a spontaneous outburst, 
without a clear goal and a strong bargaining capacity. […] the cause of its defeat is all 
here. If you do not put forward a concrete and specific goal, you are not able to influence 
the course of a policy decision. Additionally, the student organization was very magmat-
ic. A loose organization both locally and at the national level does not permit the crea-
tion of an organizational structure leading to results. The movement cannot reach its 
goals only with the power of numbers, but also needs the organizational capacity to 
pragmatically delimit its demands and the ability to go to political negotiations with its 
interlocutors.  
 
In the same vein, Professor Modica, a former MIUR in the late 1990s and one of the 
central figures of the university reforms of the 2000s, has expressed very clearly this 
point in his interview. For him, the main problem of the Italian student movement was 
its politically and organizationally fragmented character. In his words,  
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The cause of the current weakness of the movement is that the organizational field of 
the student left is too fragmented. UDU, Link and too many other organizations populate 
this universe. Small groups competing against each other without a national political 
centre, and even capable of losing student elections to CL [a conservative organization of 
Catholic students]. A terrible fragmentation. Without a nation-wide scope of action, 
which is a deleterious lack. A strong presence of organized students would improve the 
system.  
 
This interpretation seems to be shared also by the leaders of the various student or-
ganizations. For instance, Lorenzo, one of the national leaders of Link, confided to me a 
similar concern: 
 
The lack of a nation-wide movement organization has impeded the emergence of a 
national agenda and political alternative. We were not politically mature to pose con-
crete demands. Uniriot rejected completely this approach. For them, the movement had 
to convey only a rebellious generational identity to avoid having a reformist approach. 
This was wrong. We had to pose a list of demands to challenge the government.  
 
Sharing this view, Capano argued in fact, “if you do not exhibit a credible, organized, 
leadership, it becomes very difficult to express a high protest capacity and to produce 
an effective impact.” In other words, the presence of many student voices also means a 
proliferation of different political positions. In this sense, the presence of a politically 
fragmented protest field prevented the students from elaborating and agreeing on a 
shared political agenda to reform higher education. This led the Italian student move-
ment to fail to formulate an alternative vision for Italian higher education. For Profes-
sor Regini, Professor of Political Economy at Milan’s State University, this was an em-
blematic weakness of the current movement, especially when compared to the pro-
gressive political agenda of the 1968 student movement. In his words:  
 
The big difference between the movement of 1968 and the current ones lies in the 
fact that the former had progressive goals claiming social change and innovation. It was a 
vector of radical demands for social transformation. All successive movements were pro-
test movements with mostly conservative demands. They were not able to integrate 
their protest with demands for innovation and change. They were perceived as defend-
ers of the status quo. Only defensive movements. So, does this mean that you like the 
university as it is now?  
 
Professor Decleva, president of CRUI (Conferenza dei Rettori delle Università Ital-
iane, Conference of Italian University Rectors) at the time of the student protests 
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(2008-2011), shares and broadens this view by criticizing not only the protesters but 
also all other student organizations and even every academic component of the Italian 
field of higher education: 
 
In the CUN [Consiglio Universitario Nazionale, National University Board] there are on-
ly student unions, which obtain few and marginal victories and do not show great scope 
and planning in their policy. The most depressing thing is the weakness of all their politi-
cal interlocutors. As President of CRUI, I was only able to defend the existing situation, 
attempting to reduce the damages of the government's reforms and to bring public fund-
ing back. I have the impression that we no longer have an idea of where we should go. 
Academics, politicians, economic actors, students: none of these actors has a strong vi-
sion or a planned policy for the university system. This thing is very depressing. The uni-
versity system has by now become a suffocating environment that tries to live day by 
day, carrying out small political operations in order to gain little portions of power and 
money. Today, students reflect these dynamics.  
 
For several observers, this inability of the key actors in the field of higher education 
to formulate a clear political vision concerning higher education policy is one of the 
main causes that have led to the political and economic sacrifice of this sector as the 
socio-economic situation of Italians worsened with the arrival of the crisis. This sacri-
fice was enacted by Mr. Tremonti in 2008, then Minister of Economy and Finance 
(MEF), to avoid losing consensus both amongst his constituency and with the wider 
Italian public opinion. For Regini, “the cuts carried out by Tremonti and the subordina-
tion of the MIUR to the MEF has been a clear and precise political design. To lower tax-
es, especially during an economic crisis, we need to find money. You draw it from the 
sector about which your electorate doesn’t care: higher education!” 
Modica shares the same view, claiming that, “the financial dismantling of higher ed-
ucation was an idea of Tremonti. Tremonti is strongly against the idea of mass public 
universities. In his view, it is too costly for Italy. That's why he invented the cut of the 
turnover for the academic personnel.” Modica imputes this policy orientation also to 
the fact that “Italian right-wing parties perceive the university as a stronghold of leftist 
thought. For this reason, they aimed at destroying it.” With respect to this, Minister 
Berlinguer is even clearer when he affirms that “the Italian university system is an im-
portant constituency for the left, but very hostile to the right.” Decleva fully agrees 
with this interpretation. In tracing the history of the relations between politics and 
higher education in the last twenty years, he contends, in fact, that:  
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The negative turn for the sector of higher education has started when the right was in 
office. They emphasized some problems of Italian higher education to attack the system 
globally. For them, Italy spends too much on its universities. In short, the Italian right is 
very hostile to the issue of higher education. That’s why they wanted to punish the sec-
tor. Consequently, in 2008 the cuts on public spending towards the university system 
and the ‘caste’ of university barons were huge and tremendously damaging. 
 
In times of economic recession, cuts in the policy sectors that are not perceived as 
relevant by both political actors and public opinion are the first intervention normally 
carried out by governments. This is especially true when the credibility of a policy sec-
tor and of its actors has constantly declined, as it was in the case of the Italian higher 
education. As Lorenzo (Link) explicitly put it in his interview,  
 
I do believe that higher education is a truly marginal issue for our governments in the 
current political phase. If it is marginal, then the political cost of cuts is very low. In the 
Sixties, the university was still elitist. This means that students had an enormous legiti-
macy. Students were considered as gentlemen. Today, their social legitimacy has signifi-
cantly changed. At that time, students were a part of the Italian elite addressing some 
political demands to the system.  
 
The reasons as to why the lack of response by the Italian government to student 
protesters was not seen as very costly in political and electoral should by now be clear-
er. Forced to face the most negative effects of the crisis, the government did not have 
any interest in engaging in negotiations over an issue, that of higher education, which 
not only did not represent a priority for the Italian public opinion (see the Eurobarome-
ter data, Fig. 1), but was also a policy field closely related to the Italian left and its tradi-
tional voters. It is again Lorenzo who suggests this interpretation when he claims that: 
 
As students in mobilization, we were forced to face a very difficult political situation, 
since the right wing parties in government were fully against the idea of opening up a di-
alogue with us. There was a dynamic of strong polarization. If you take to the streets, 
then you are considered a political enemy of the government. Consequently, there is no 
room for political manoeuvre and negotiation.  
 
In this sense, and even in light of the absence of a politically credible interlocutor on 
the students’ side, the choice not to negotiate with the students was seen by the Ital-
ian government as the most plausible political solution in both 2008 and 2010. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
Through this article, I have presented and discussed some hypotheses on the policy 
outcomes of social protests (Burstein 1999, Giugni 2004, Kolb 2007, Luders 2016) by 
explaining why the Italian student protests of 2008 and 2010 failed to influence key 
policy decisions affecting the sector of higher education (i.e. the withdrawal of two na-
tional laws). Even though Italian students were able to positively modify, to a certain 
extent, the public’s orientation on the contentious issues (especially the media cover-
age), they did not manage to persuade the government that such a shift was so signifi-
cant to induce a policy change. What is more—as noted by several policy experts—the 
lack of consideration that the Italian government exhibited vis-à-vis the student de-
mands had also to do with the traditionally low level of public interest towards the is-
sue of higher education. Also in light of such a context, the politically and organization-
ally fragmented student mobilizations did not gain a sufficient credibility to be per-
ceived as a credible threat in terms of loss of consensus by the Italian government. The 
latter was thus able to take advantage of the low interest that Italian society showed 
towards the issue and of the protesters’ low political credibility to hijack the protests 
and implement its full policy agenda. 
 
Appendix 
Students: 
Alice, LINK (Turin); Chiara, LINK (Turin); Andrea, LINK (Turin); Davide, LINK (Turin); Luca, 
National spokesperson of Link (Turin); Fabio, LINK (Rome); Elena, LINK (Rome); Loren-
zo, LINK (Padua); Roberta, LINK (Naples); Gianluca, Collettivo Universitario Autonomo 
(CUA) and Askatasuna (Turin); Simone, CUA (Turin); Matilde, CUA (Turin); Giorgio, Ate-
nei in Rivolta (Rome); Luca, UniRiot (Rome); Tiziano, Uniriot (Rome); Fabio, Uniriot and 
Esc (Rome); Giancarlo, Red-net (Naples); Giovanni, Laboratorio 081 (Naples); Luca, La-
boratorio 081 (Naples); Mauro, Laboratorio 081 (Naples) 
 
Policy experts:  
 
Professor Marino Regini, Chair in Political Economy at Milan’s State University 
Professor Giliberto Capano, Chair in Public Policy at the University of Bologna 
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Professor Roberto Moscati, Chair in Sociology of Education at the University Bicocca of 
Milan 
 
University and political actors: 
Doctor Bruno Catalano, consultant of the university funding system for the Italian Min-
istry of Education, University and Research in the years 1993-1998 
Professor Luigi Berlinguer, former Ministry of Education, University, and Research (MI-
UR) 
Professor Luciano Modica, former MIUR undersecretary 
Professor Enrico Decleva, president of CRUI (Conferenza dei Rettori delle Università Ita-
liane, Conference of Italian University Rectors 
 
Statistics and political documents consulted: 
Documenti finali dell’assemblea nazionale del movimento studentesco italiano (15/16 
novembre 2008) “Autoriforma dell’Onda: Didattica, Welfare e Ricerca” 
(http://old.sbilanciamoci.info/Sezioni/alter/Universita-in-onda-ecco-i-testi-dell-
autoriforma-su-didattica-welfare-e-ricerca.html; accessed 3March 2017) 
Link, Report AltraRiforma 2011, http://linkcoordinamentouniversitario.it/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/report%20e%20testo%20altrariforma.pdf; accessed 3 March 
2017). 
European Commission data on the most politically salient issues among European, 
What do you think are the two most important issues facing (OUR COUNTRY) at the 
moment? Italy (from 05/2005 to 05/2016), 
(http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/char
tType/lineChart//themeKy/42/groupKy/208/savFile/54; accessed 15 September 2016) 
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